When it comes to military power, US President Donald Trump has taken a flagrant position. On the one hand, Trump is skeptical of foreign tangle. He quickly retreated with Russia in the hope of ending the war in Ukraine. The “First American” foreign policy is generally criticized military participation abroad. During the opening discourse, he said that his second presidency will be judged by “wars that we have never entered.” On the other hand, Trump is constantly outperforming the American military force. The Foreign Ministry announced that the United States will enter if China attacked lands, ships or aircraft from the Philippines – an ally of the American Treaty. He has made inflamed threats against Iran and North Korea. Since his election, Trump has also been a driver towards our friends, declaring that Canada “will create a great country” and that he is considering using the army to take Greenland and Panama.
On the surface, this mixture of isolation and enthusiasm may seem reflects the inability to predict the general prediction of Trump, or even the inconsistency. The president, after all, is known for expressing opinions that contradict his broader positions. But it turned out that the American public is also ready to use force despite the clear preference for withdrawal. The country swollen violently in its sincerity, from isolation in the thirties of the twentieth century to the enemies in the early eighties. But now, I have assumed a hedgehog -like position, retreating but still thorny. When asked if they believed that Washington should play a larger or smaller role in the world, most Americans choose a decrease in the fingerprint. But in a survey we conducted in July from ordinary Americans as well as about former US policy makers, we found that the clear majority supported the attacking of China if the People's Liberation Army was hitting the American ships in the South China Sea. They were supportive regardless of whether the American forces were killed in strikes. The results indicate that the Americans will be ready to deploy American forces against other US opponents as well.
These results do not mean that Americans are demanding war. Trump's first period was generally characterized by self -control when it comes to new military conflicts, and there are many reasons for the belief that Washington will want to avoid conflict with its competitors in general – and Beijing in particular. But this indicates that if the tensions are glowing in the South China Sea, elsewhere with China, or with other major opponents, support for the mobilization of the American terrestrial forces may be much more vulnerable than it is generally assumed. Washington's foreign policy does not always dictate public opinion. But the departments tend to be sensitive to public opinions on the deployment of forces, and therefore these results indicate that the war can erupt if opponents attack the American forces.
From two minds
When asked directly, most Americans say they want to retreat from the world. In a survey in the New York Times in January 2025, 60 percent of the respondents said they wanted the United States to pay less attention to problems abroad and focuses “on problems here at home” – including 75 percent of Republicans (compared to 47 percent of Democrats). Only 38 percent of the respondents wanted the United States to be “active in global affairs.” Likewise, the recent Chicago Revenge Council found that only 17 percent of Americans thought that the wealth of the United States and its power means “bearing the responsibility for placing a pioneering role in global affairs.”
However, there are signs that American opinions about the international role of their country are complicated. According to the research conducted by the political scientist Jeffrey Friedman, American voters always prefer presidential candidates who are more aggressive than those who are not. Friedman found that voters support the falcon policies even when they claim they want more policies. In the nineties, for example, the Americans told polls that they are opposed to American military intervention in the Balkans. But after President Bill Clinton began bombing Serbia, his approval rankings rose.
However, it is one thing to bomb a much weaker discount. It is something completely to go to war against a strong one. To determine what the Americans will feel about the use of power in this type of position, we conducted a experimental survey that includes a potential clash in the South China Sea, the water body that surrounds Taiwan and a third of the global shipping location. This may be the main site for competition between Beijing and Washington, where both Chinese and American warships are patrolling in their waters routinely. (It is also a place where the Trump administration wants to focus the US military authority, unlike Europe.) In a poll supported by the Chicago project on security, threats and its implementation, the Research Organization was told us, 2000 ordinary Americans and 700 of the former policy makers to imagine that China attacked the American aircraft carrier off the coast of an American ally in the region. Half of the respondents were told that 250 American sailors died in the attack, while the other half was told that he had not killed any sailor. Then we asked them whether they would support Washington by publishing additional powers in the region and whether these additional forces should be assigned to launch Counstrikes on Chinese and air assets.
In total, he supported 51 percent of Counstrike when he did not kill sailors. When the sailors were killed, 57 percent of the strike approved. The Republicans were particularly supporting revenge by force: 60 percent approved revenge when no sailor was killed, and 67 percent did when the deaths occurred. (The error margin of the results we reached was three percentage points.) In particular, we conducted this poll when Joe Biden, Democrat, was still president, indicating that the Republicans believed – at least towards China – from the wisdom of his position. Democrats, on the other hand, were more cautious. It was divided evenly, with 50 percent support of Counstrike if the Chinese attack does not lead to no victims. Support rose to 57 percent if American soldiers were killed.
But the Americans were not the first in the first place by seeking revenge on the deaths. Only 36 percent of the respondents who were extracted from the general public said this is a very important factor in their decision. Instead, the Americans seemed more interested in protecting the reputation of the United States. Among the general respondents who supported a contract against China after the death of the American sailors, 53 percent said that power is necessary to maintain Washington's international reputation, compared to only 16 percent of those who did not support Counstrike. Among the Republicans, 63 percent said that the need to respond by force to maintain the reputation of the United States. It is an open discussion between international relations scientists exactly how much US behavior in a crisis with China will affect the behavior of other competitors, such as Iran. But regardless of the actual influence, voters appear to believe that planting a reputation to solve matters.
Trigger
The results we have reached have effects on the other US opponents. Although we did not ask about Iran or Russia, the Americans may likely take revenge if these countries hit the American forces. The American public, after all, holds negative views for them: 81 percent of Americans looking at Iran in the inaccurate, and the 2024 poll indicated that the majority of Americans support the use of American forces if Iran attacks Israel. Likewise, a PEW research poll shows that 86 percent of Americans view Russia inadequate. This includes 88 percent of Republicans and Republicans, despite Trump's favorable language towards Moscow. The 2024 Yougov poll found that many Republicans support three times the defense of the NATO ally who was subjected to amateurs in exchange for not defending it.
There are possible limits for this support. The context has always been the American public's willingness to use strength. People are likely to be supportive if Washington interacts with aggression, if the American attack is likely to succeed, and if the interests of the United States are important to the test. On the contrary, they were not constantly prepared to support the use of power when these conditions were absent-and this is part of the reason not to intervene the United States during the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary, the Pakistani Indian wars 1965 and 1971, and the genocide of Rwanda 1995. For this reason, the United States did not deepen in the Syrian civil war, which limits its interference in the endowment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
The Americans are still willing to use force against China, a nuclear armed opponent, raising the risk of Washington if Beijing attacks it. This is especially true during the Trump era, the amazing consumer of the right -wing media and is compatible with the beliefs of the Republicans. But this does not mean that the conflict between the two countries is likely. Nuclear weapons also state that China and the United States are still strongly excited to avoid direct war. He does not want a struggle that may end the world.
The Americans are deeply interested in protecting the reputation of the United States.
History indicates that deterrence will carry. The United States has succeeded in the entire Cold War without fighting its Soviet opponent. Meanwhile, Beijing was unwilling to confront the US military. In the Taiwan Strait crises in the fifties of the last century, Chinese leader Mao Zaidog ordered his forces to avoid attacking American forces directly. China fell in 1995, when the United States responded against warrior missile tests, and remained calm in 1999 after the United States accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. China found a quick diplomatic solution in 2001 after the air collided with an American plane that killed a Chinese fighter pilot.
Countries are much more fair than they were at the beginning of the millennium. However, even as its strength grows, Beijing is still reluctant to bend its military strength. So far, China has launched electronic attacks instead of air strikes against Taiwan. He was shocked by the Philippines ships, but they generally used non -deadly lasers and water cannons to repel the Philippine ships. It is possible that the willingness to use force can enhance stability in US -Chinese relations. By noting that it will support the Philippines, the Trump administration can push China to make a decision to calm its provocations instead of testing the president.
However, Trump may be more likely to attract the United States into a war than people believe. The president seems to be more interested in ending conflicts in seeking to achieve the Nobel Peace Prize. But he speaks loudly. If the United States is attacked, the Americans are ready to allow it with a large stick.
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