The only non-controversial thing about Donald Trump is how he won his second term. Despite opinion polls showing statistical heat and fears of a long wait for the election results, Trump's victory was declared early last Wednesday morning. And unlike in 2016, he won the popular vote as well as the Electoral College, improving his margins in nearly every demographic. Republicans won a strong majority in the Senate, 53 seats, and are likely to retain control of the House of Representatives. For the rest of the world, the picture should be clear: Trump's “Make America Great Again” movement will define US foreign policy for the next four years.
Any close observer of Trump's first term should be aware of his foreign policy preferences as well as his foreign policy process. However, there are likely to be three major differences between Trump's foreign policies in his first and second terms. First, Trump will take office with a more cohesive national security team than he had in 2017. Second, the state of the world in 2025 will be somewhat different than it was in 2017. And third, foreign actors will have a much better read on events. Donald Trump.
Trump will navigate world politics with more confidence this time. Whether he will have any better luck in subjecting the world to his brand of “America First” is another question entirely. But what is certain is that the era of American exceptionalism is over. Under Trump, American foreign policy will stop promoting old American ideals. This, coupled with the expected rise in corrupt foreign policy practices, will make the United States look like a diversified superpower.
Rules of the game
Trump's foreign policy worldview has been clear since he entered political life. He believes that the liberal international order created by the United States has, over time, become anti-American. To change this imbalance, Trump wants to restrict economic inflows such as imports and immigrants (although he likes inward foreign direct investment). He wants allies to bear more of the burden to defend themselves. He believes he can cut deals with autocrats, such as Russian President Vladimir Putin or North Korea's Kim Jong Un, that would reduce tensions in global trouble spots and allow the United States to focus inward.
It is equally clear Trump's preferred means of getting what he wants in world politics. The former and future president is a strong believer in using coercion, such as economic sanctions, to pressure other actors. He also supports the “madman theory,” in which he will threaten massive tariff increases or “fire and fury” against other countries, firmly believing that such threats will force them to make greater concessions than they would otherwise. But at the same time, Trump also practices a transactional view of foreign policy, demonstrating his willingness during his first term to connect disparate issues to secure economic favors. On China, for example, Trump has repeatedly shown willingness to compromise on other issues – the crackdown in Hong Kong, crackdowns in Xinjiang, and the arrest of a senior executive at the Chinese technology company Huawei – in exchange for a better bilateral trade deal. .
Trump's foreign policy record during his first term was decidedly mixed. If we look at the renegotiated agreements related to the South Korea Free Trade Agreement or the North American Free Trade Agreement (renamed the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement), we find that his attempts at coercion have produced only meager results. The same applies to his meeting with Kim Jong Un. But one could argue that this may have been due to the somewhat chaotic nature of the Trump White House. There have been many times when Trump has seemed at war with his administration, often leading to his most common foreign policy advisers (such as Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster) being described as “the adults in the room.” The result has been a lot of personnel turnover and foreign policy positioning, which has deteriorated Trump's ability to achieve his goals.
Trump 2.0 will bury the power of American exceptionalism.
This should not be a problem for Trump's second term. Over the past eight years, he has amassed enough aides to staff his foreign policy and national security team with like-minded officials. He is unlikely to face resistance from political appointees. Other checks on Trump's policy will be much weaker. The legislative and judicial branches of government are now friendlier to MAGA than they were in 2017. Trump has indicated several times that he intends to purge the military and the bureaucracy of professionals who oppose his policies, and will likely use Schedule F — a measure to reclassify civil service positions as Political positions – to force them to resign. In the next few years, the United States will speak with one voice on foreign policy, and that voice will be Trump's.
Although Trump's ability to lead the foreign policy machinery will be enhanced, his ability to improve the United States' standing in the world is another matter. The most prominent US engagements are in Ukraine and Gaza. During the 2024 campaign, Trump criticized Biden for the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, asserting that “the humiliation in Afghanistan led to the collapse of American credibility and respect around the world.” A similar outcome in Ukraine would create similar political problems for Trump. In Gaza, Trump urged Benjamin Netanyahu to “finish the job” and destroy Hamas. However, Netanyahu's lack of strategic vision to accomplish this mission suggests that Israel will be engaged in a continuing war that has alienated many of the United States' potential partners in the world. The reality is that Trump will find it more difficult to withdraw the United States from these conflicts than he claimed during his campaign.
Moreover, the global rules of the game have changed since 2017, when existing US initiatives, alliances, and institutions were still enjoying a great deal of success. Meanwhile, other great powers became more active in creating and strengthening their own structures independent of the United States. These range from BRICS+ to OPEC+ to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. More informally, one can see the “coalition of sanctioned countries,” where China, North Korea, and Iran are happy to help Russia disrupt the global order. Trump may want to join some of these gatherings rather than create convincing alternatives to them. His declared efforts to divide these groupings are likely to fail. Autocrats may not trust each other, but they will trust Donald Trump even more.
However, the most important difference between Trump 2.0 and Trump 1.0 is also the simplest: Donald Trump is now a known commodity on the global stage. As Elizabeth Saunders, a professor at Columbia University, recently noted, “In the 2016 election, Trump’s foreign policy was somewhat ambiguous. . . . But in 2024, Trump’s actions will be much easier to predict. The candidate who wanted to be ‘the crazy one’ “And I like the idea of keeping other countries guessing. He's become a politician with a pretty predictable agenda.” Leaders like Xi, Putin, Kim, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and even French President Emmanuel Macron have witnessed Trump's cynical style before. Both great powers and small nations now know that the best way to deal with Trump is to shower him with pomp and circumstance, refrain from publicly checking his facts, make flashy but symbolic concessions, and generally remain safe on the substance. Interests will be preserved. Trump's negotiating style achieved minimal tangible gains in his first term; He will yield less than that in his second term.
It is no longer an exception
Does all this mean that Trump 2.0 will be just the same? Not exactly. Trump's re-election heralds two trends in American foreign policy that will be difficult to reverse. The first is the inevitable corruption that would jeopardize American politics. Previous policy directors in previous administrations, from Henry Kissinger to Hillary Clinton, have leveraged their public service through book deals, keynote speeches, and geopolitical consulting. However, former Trump officials have taken this to a whole new level. Advisers such as Trump's son-in-law and White House aide Jared Kushner and Richard Grenell, the former ambassador and acting director of national intelligence, have leveraged the relationships they established as policymakers to secure billions in foreign investment (including foreign government investment funds). And real estate deals immediately after leaving office. It would not be surprising if foreign donors approached Trump's coterie of advisers with implicit and explicit promises of lucrative deals beyond their time in power — as long as they play ball while they are in power. If we combine this with the expected role that billionaires like Elon Musk will play in Trump 2.0, we can expect a significant increase in US foreign policy corruption.
Another trend that Trump 2.0 will accelerate is the end of American exceptionalism. From Harry Truman to Joe Biden, US presidents have embraced the idea that American values and ideals play an important role in American foreign policy. This claim has been challenged at various times, but promoting democracy and promoting human rights has been viewed as a national interest for some time. Political scientist Joseph Nye has argued that these American ideals constitute an essential element of American soft power.
American policy blunders, as well as Russia's “why” policy – deflecting criticism of someone else's bad behavior by pointing out someone else's bad behavior – have eroded the power of American exceptionalism. Trump 2.0 will bury it. In fact, Trump himself espouses a version of theism when it comes to American values. Early in his first term, he said: “We have too many killers. What do you think – our country is so innocent?
At the time, foreign audiences could reason that most Americans did not believe it, given that Trump did not win the popular vote. The 2024 elections shatter this belief. During his campaign, Trump promised to bomb Mexico and deport legal immigrants, called opposition politicians “enemies within,” and claimed immigrants were “poisoning the blood” of the country. Despite all this – or perhaps because of it – Trump won a popular majority. When the rest of the world looks at Trump, they will no longer see an aberration of American exceptionalism; They will see what America stands for in the twenty-first century.
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