During their recent visit to Kyiv, U.S. Senators Richard Blumenthal and Lindsey Graham made headlines with their pledges to bolster U.S. support for Ukraine, including telling Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that “we will fight to get another supplemental aid package before the end of the calendar year.”
With the last arduous process for providing supplemental aid to Ukraine set to end in April 2024, any new package is likely to have a smoother path through Congress, thanks to more political cover for congressional Republicans and growing public support for the aid. But having to debate whether the United States should aid Ukraine every year is not sustainable. Instead, it is time for the United States to match its allies by passing meaningful, long-term support for Ukraine. If implemented correctly, the Blumenthal-Graham proposal could soon make that a reality.
Talk of another supplemental aid package may come as a surprise to some. A $61 billion package was passed just a few months ago. But that package wasn’t supposed to last long. The Biden administration originally requested a short-term supplemental package in August 2023 to cover the rest of the year, with larger aid expected in early 2024.
But the White House miscalculated Congress’s position, and the issue became subject to long delays. The updated supplemental aid request that came from the White House in October 2023, which is nearly identical to the package that eventually passed in April 2024, was instead designed to provide military assistance to Ukraine until just after the November 2024 election.
While the April 2024 supplemental package was announced as a $61 billion package, the bulk of that figure consists of long-term funding for U.S. defense production and financial assistance to Ukraine. Only $7.8 billion is allocated for the Presidential Withdrawal Authority, the primary mechanism the United States uses to send weapons to Ukraine. If the president does not exercise all of it, it could expire as soon as September 30 without notice of extension from the Secretary of State.
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Despite the challenges that the latest round of Ukraine aid faced, major policy changes surrounding the issue and shifting power dynamics in Congress mean that any new supplemental aid may not face the same hurdles. The April 2024 aid package was delayed for months by House Republicans, with Speaker Mike Johnson fearing that hardliners would strip him of his leadership as they had his predecessor. But Johnson eventually came around not only to the urgent need to help Ukraine win, but also that he had the political cover to do so. Democrats vowed to save his job if it was at stake, and, most important, former President Donald Trump came out publicly to support the speaker’s efforts and back him after the package passed.
Many Republicans in Congress feared that supporting aid to Ukraine would cost them their seats, and the by-election battle came as members of Congress faced their own party primaries. Some incumbents have been accused of putting Ukraine’s interests above those of the United States and have faced attack ads over their previous votes in favor of aid to Ukraine.
Crucially, every member of Congress who voted for the April 2024 supplemental aid package won a primary. The importance of this cannot be overstated. The primary results are likely to assuage Republican concerns that support for Ukraine could cripple their political careers. Conversely, given that polls show majority support for U.S. aid to Ukraine, this could be an advantage.
If a new supplemental aid package is introduced, it will likely find a Congress filled with Republicans who feel more empowered to vote for Ukraine. Also important is a Republican president who is now eager to sound the alarm about Russia’s persecution of Christians in Ukraine and the need to help Ukraine stop Russian President Vladimir Putin’s advance into Europe.
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As long as the United States continues to negotiate aid to Ukraine on an annual basis, it is impossible for Kiev to meaningfully plan long-term strategies. The reason European commitments to Ukraine remain roughly twice as large as American ones is that many European governments have made commitments for many years. To break the cycle of uncertainty, the United States must do the same.
Blumenthal and Graham’s idea of codifying the U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security agreement into law could be the answer. Because the agreement is not a binding treaty and focuses more on principles of support for Ukraine than specific commitments, it was seen by many in Washington as a promising first step when U.S. President Joe Biden and Zelensky signed it in June.
Legislating this document would result in the most significant security agreement in Ukraine’s history. The agreement sets out a roadmap for transforming the Ukrainian military into a modern fighting force capable of deterring and defeating future Russian aggression, as well as substantive plans for economic support, governance reform, and meaningful military cooperation that falls short of formal treaty obligations.
Timing is key, and the smart move is to wait until after the November presidential election. The latest supplemental bill passed only because Trump chose not to veto it. There is still a real risk that bringing Ukraine back into the American political debate too soon could give Trump incentive to sabotage any aid package in order to deny the Biden-Harris administration a political win.
American support will be the decisive factor in determining whether Ukraine can defeat the Russian invasion and remain safe from future attempts by Moscow to rearm and try again. Despite the wild swings in American politics in recent years, strong bipartisan support for Ukraine has been a rare constant. If there is one issue that will break the cycle of short-term planning in Washington, it is ensuring that Ukraine ultimately prevails.
Doug Klein is a policy analyst at Razum for Ukraine, a humanitarian aid nonprofit advocating for additional U.S. support for Ukraine, and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.
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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.
The Eurasia Center's mission is to promote transatlantic cooperation to advance stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the west to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the east.
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PHOTO: Ukrainian and U.S. flags are seen during a meeting between U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustam Umarov at the Pentagon, in Washington, D.C., August 30, 2024. (Reuters/Daniel Becerril)
