US President Donald Trump has repeatedly put forward the idea of staying in office after the end of his second term in 2029. Since the twenty -second amendment to the United States Constitution was ratified in 1951, no American president has challenged the limit that he created.
However, attempts to circumvent the limits of the constitutional period were not unprecedented elsewhere.
Almost every country in Latin America has constitutional constitutional borders as protection against tyranny. These rules differ: some only allow one term, while others allow two, while others allow an uninterrupted re -election. However, many presidents managed to challenge these provisions.
Modern examples include Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Nayeb Boucil in El Salvador.
Although institutional standards and political cultures in these countries differ from those in the United States, studying how to dismantle the boundaries of the term provide valuable visions on how any similar efforts are evolved by Trump.
How did the presidents overcome their term
The most common tactic is to guarantee the presidents first that their political party in the legislative body is completely subject to them, then benefit from the sincere majority to amend the constitution – a step that has already started in the United States
Ortega and Correa have successfully used their legislative majority to pass the constitutional amendments that canceled the limits of the duration in Nicaragua and Ecuador.
Whether Trump has achieved the same level of fixed loyalty between Republicans, it is discussed, but obtaining adjustments through the US Congress is more difficult. The process requires a two -thirds majority in both chambers, followed by ratification of three -quarters of the state's legislative bodies.
On the other hand, the constitution of Nicaragua can be amended by a majority of 60 percent, and as in Ecuador, the without patriotism states have no opinion on this issue.
Another decisive step involves participation or seizure of the judiciary. In Bolivia, Morales achieved a controversial third state in 2014 with the support of a party constitutional court. Recently, an agent of El Salvador obtained the Supreme Court ruling in 2021 (from the judges who appointed him), which allowed him to seek his immediate re -election in 2024, despite the constitutional ban on successive conditions.
We have seen a disturbing pattern of subordination of Trump by the US Supreme Court. The limits of this respect are increasingly uncertain.
Securing popular support
Some presidents have turned into a ligament to give legitimacy to the constitutional absurdity by challenging the voters and framing this step as a democratic exercise. Chavez used this strategy in Venezuela, and won a 2009 referendum to cancel the limits of the duration.
The lack of a national referendum mechanism in the United States-where popular consultations are organized at the level of patriotism (the state)-limits the options available to a president who seeks to remove the limits of the period through this type of popular miser.
Regarding this, the populist presidents who succeeded in defrauding the borders of the range have usually done this while enjoying high levels of public support.
(AP Photo/Carlos Osorio)
Korea has maintained approval categories near 70 percent in a large part of his presidency, while independent opinion polls have put in place support for an agent of more than 80 percent. Both, along with Morales and Chavez, have benefited from their popularity to justify constitutional changes through legislative and judicial channels, and their actions framing as implementing the will of people.
On the other hand, Trump's approval ratings remained constantly lower. Currently, its ability to guest fall in the 1940s, which makes any attempt to demand a widely popular mandate for a third questionable term.
Military issues
Because of the inevitable opposition, military support is essential in trying any leader to challenge the constitution. In a large part of Latin America, the army is being politicized significantly, and the armed forces have been formed historically by the doctrines of internal control instead of external defense.
This trend is swinging in national security ideologies during the Cold War, and it casts local opponents (“socialists”, the movements of the indigenous population, and the federations) as internal enemies, and the legitimacy of repression as a national duty.
In some countries, the military oath reflects this politicization. In both Nicaragua and Venezuela, this right is increasingly emphasizing loyalty to the president or the ruling party and their revolutionary heritage, undermining institutional neutrality.
In contrast, in the United States, military individuals swore an oath to defend the constitution, not the president. While they must follow orders, they must be in line with these constitutional and legal limits.
(AP Photo/Eric Gay)
The absence of the tradition of the use of soldiers against American citizens and the institutional culture of constitutional loyalty and political neutrality, at least in principle, provides some protection against the authoritarian transgression that allowed some Latin American presidents to remain in power indefinitely.
But a large part of the American armed forces tends to be politically right, such as their Latin American counterparts, which raises fears that partisan sympathy within the army can affect their response to the constitutional crisis.
Moreover, the increasing use of non-military security forces-such as local police and enforcement of immigration and customs (ICE)-shows against civilians that the state has a set of tools at its disposal to exercise control.
The United States government's use of ice is mentioned how governments in countries such as Venezuela and Nicaragua used police units and paramilitary units loyal to the president with impunity to suppress the opposition.
Read more: How the ice has become a secret police force under Trump's management
The risk of contentment
Many people in the West still adhere to the belief that constitutional erosion is something that only happens in the global south. Some believe that American institutions are uniquely flexible, and thus are able to withstand any attempt to sabotage the constitution.
For many of our history, this confidence may be justified, but today, it is not only satisfied but dangerous.
The power of democratic institutions depends on the political will to defend them. Time will determine whether the barriers in the United States are strong enough to withstand the pressure on which they are now. What is clear is that relying on increasingly weak institutional flexibility or historical exception is not a substitute for vigilance and active defense of democratic standards.
